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NOTES
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE:
THE COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST
An election in which only property taxpayers could vote was
held to approve the issuance of revenue bonds to finance the
expansion and improvement of the city-owned utility system.
Appellant, who did not own property, sued to enjoin the issuance
of the bonds and for a declaratory judgment that limitation of
the right to vote to property taxpayers is unconstitutional. A
three-judge federal district court found the election constitu-
tional.' On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court held
that such a denial of the right to vote is a violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Cipriano v. City
of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) .2
In a similar case, New York law provided that in the area
in question the school board was to be elected at an annual meet-
ing of qualified school district voters. To qualify as such, an
otherwise qualified voter had to (1) own or lease taxable real
property, (2) be the spouse of one who owns or leases real
property, or (3) be the parent or guardian of a child in school.
Appellant, a 31-year-old college-educated bachelor who lived
with his parents, was denied the right to vote for the school board.
He challenged the constitutionality of the voting requirements in
a three-judge federal district court which held the requirements
valid.3 The United States Supreme Court held that the require-
ments were a denial of equal protection. Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
The right to vote is said to be a fundamental right.4 How-
ever, it is not usually thought of as a "natural" nor "inalienable"
nor "universal" right.5 Despite the fact that parts of the original
1. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 286 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1968).
2. The holding was applied only prospectively, but was applied to this
case since the suit was brought within the prescriptive period for challeng-
ing the election. While the suit was pending, the Louisiana legislature passed
Act 33 of the Extra Session of 1968 providing that in the future a local gov-
erning body at its discretion could hold revenue bond elections in which only
people who own property could vote or an election where all qualified resi-
dents could vote.
3. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 259 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. N.Y.
1966).
4. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23(1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
5. See Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 628, 633 (1904). If by fundamental
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Constitution8 and five amendments7 concern voting, the right to
vote in state elections is not expressly guaranteed by the United
States Constitution.8 When the Constitution was ratified, most of
the states required property ownership as a qualification for
voting in a general election.9 Most of these voting requirements
lasted at least until the Jacksonian era.' Although the states
cannot deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race" or
sex,1 2 "the States have long been held to have broad powers to
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may
be exercised."' 3 In fact, the only thing that seems to require a
state to extend the right to vote in state elections to anyone is
the guarantee of republican government clause. 14 Whether a par-
ticular state government is a republic or not has been held to be
a political question which the Court cannot decide.15 However,
Congress would be certain to act if a state set up any government
other than a republican government. In effect, the states are
politically and historically bound to extend the right to vote to
some of their citizens. Once this is done the persons not extended
is meant important, then the right to vote is certainly fundamental since It
is necessary to preserve other rights. On the other hand, if by fundamental
is meant "natural" or "universal," then the right to vote would not be in-
cluded since it cannot belong to all people. For example, children-even
infants-have such rights as the right to free speech or the right to a fair
trial. Our Constitution guarantees such right to all people. However, some
agency of the government must decide such things as the age at which a
person may vote, i.e., which people may vote and which people may not vote.
6. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2, 4.
7. Id. amends. XV, XVII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV.
8. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874). The right to vote in national elections is not
strictly a right to vote granted by the state since art. 1, § 2, cl. 1, of the
United States Constitution says: "The House of Representatives shall be
composed of members chosen . . .by the people .... ." See Wessberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
9. Only Georgia, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina did
not have property qualifications for voting, but these states had taxpaying
qualifications. Vermont, Kentucky, and Indiana entered the Union without
property or taxpaying qualifications. However, Tennessee entered with
property qualifications; and Ohio, Louisiana and Mississippi entered with
taxpaying qualifications. K. PORTER, A HISTORY or SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES 110 (1918).
10. Id. at 78-79.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
12. Id. amend. XIX.
13. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50
(1959).
14. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
15. Plaintiffs In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), alleged a denial of re-
publican government, but the Court clearly indicated the basis of the decision
was the equal protection clause. "But because any reliance on the Guaranty
Clause could not have succeeded it does not follow that appellants may not
be heard on the equal protection claim which in fact they tender ... "
I. at 227.
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the franchise will be able to raise equal protection questions, since
the prohibition against denial of equal protection extends to all
state action."6
A strong argument can be made that the equal protection
clause was not meant to affect in any way the right of the states
to decide the conditions under which a person could vote.17 This
position is based upon statements made on the floor of Congress
at the time the fourteenth amendment was debated.18 Strongest
support for this argument comes from the fourteenth amendment
itself, since section two of the amendment indicates that states
still have an absolute right to decide who can vote, but if they
deny or abridge the right to vote to males over twenty-one the
number for the basis for representation will be reduced propor-
tionally.1V The passage of the fifteenth and nineteenth amend-
ments also supports this position. Early cases held that the four-
teenth amendment did not change the control that the states had
over voting.20 These cases stated that the voting laws of the states
could not discriminate in violation of the United States Constitu-
tion but it was clear that this referred to the fifteenth amend-
ment rather than the fourteenth amendment.21
The Court has never considered itself bound completely by
historical argument.22 The framers of the fourteenth amendment,
although mainly concerned with discrimination based on race,
apparently intended to end other types of class legislation.'2 The
early cases which refused to apply the fourteenth amendment to
suffrage dealt with the question of whether the right to vote was
one of the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United
16. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964).
18. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 593 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting, citing
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459-3149 (1866)).
19. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
20. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 622 (1904); United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214, 218 (1875); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874).
21. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1875).
22. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966): "In
determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never
been confined to historic notions of equality."
23. The opposite was held with four Justices dissenting in the Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). However, the language of the first
section of the fourteenth amendment is general and does not specifically
refer to race, whereas the fifteenth amendment does. Some examples of the
application of the fourteenth amendment to non-racial discrimination are
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimates); Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (aliens); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)
(aliens); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (aliens).
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States.2 4 The case most often cited for failure to apply the four-
teenth amendment to suffrage cases is Pope v. Williams.25 After
stating that the reasonableness of state voting requirements was
not a federal question, the Court in Pope went on to say:
"It is unnecessary in this case to assert that under no
conceivable state of facts could a state statute in regard to
voting be regarded as an infringement upon or a discrimina-
tion against the individual rights of a citizen of the United
States removing into a state and excluded from voting therein
by state legislation . . . [for example] excluding from that
privilege, for instance, a citizen . . . coming from New York
or any other state. In such a case an argument might be
urged that, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, the citizen from Georgia was by the state
statute deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Other
extreme cases might be suggested."
The noted cases represent only the third time the equal pro-
tection clause has been used to annul state voter qualification
requirements.- However, the main significance of these cases is
the way in which the Court determined whether or not the
state requirements were a denial of equal protection. The tradi-
tional test for the equal protection clause is one of reasonableness:
is there a rational basis for the classification that the state has
made?2 But because of the fundamental nature of the right to
vote" the court held a different test applied in Kramer and
Cipriano:
24. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). The issue of equal
protection was not raised in this case.
25. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1904).
26. Id. at 634.
27. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
"[One] would gather from today's opinion that it is an established consti-
tutional tenet that state laws governing the qualifications of voters are sub-
ject to the limitations of the Equal Protection Clause. Yet any dispassionate
survey of the past will reveal that the present decision is the first to so
hold." The second decision was the Poll Tax Case, Harper v. Virginia Ed.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The reapportionment cases and Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1969), can be distinguished since they are concerned
with equal protection of persons already made voters by the states. See
Note, 33 U. ON. L. REv. 483, 495 (1964).
28. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 636 (1969)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26
(1961); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959); Kotch
v. Board of River Port Pilots Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
29. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969)
(quoting from Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964): "'[S]ince the right
to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative
of other basic civil and political rights any alleged infringement of the right
of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.'"
[Vol. 30
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"[I]f a challenged state statute grants the right to vote
to some bona fide resident of requisite age and citizenship and
denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine
whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling
state interest."-"
The Court restated this test in Cipriano but, as was pointed out
in a concurring opinion, the classification made by the city of
Houma would have been invalid even under the rational basis
test 1 since the revenue bonds at issue were to be paid for by the
profits of the utility company and had nothing to do with prop-
erty taxes.82 However, the new test was thought necessary to
decide Kramer. Mr. Justice Stewart (with whom Mr. Justice
Black and Mr. Justice Harlan joined) wrote a dissenting opinion
urging that the traditional equal protection test should apply.8
The court felt that the more rigid test should be applied since the
right to vote is necessary to preserve other rights:
"The presumption of constitutionality and the approval
given rational classifications in other types of enactments are
based on an assumption that the institutions of state govern-
ment are structured so as to represent fairly all the people.
However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect a
challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no
longer serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality. '8 4
This type of reasoning would seem to indicate that the "com-
pelling state interest" test would only apply to voting rights cases.
However, this test is not completely new with the noted cases,
and the Court has applied it in other types of cases involving
fundamental rights.3 5 In fact the "compelling state interest" test
evolved out of cases involving racial classifications, and because
of the history of the fourteenth amendment, 6 it has been applied
30. Id. at 627.
31. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 707 (1969) (Black & Stewart,
JJ., concurring).
32. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 286 F. Supp. 823, 829 (E.D. La. 1968) (Wis-
dom, J., dissenting).
33. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 895 U.S. 621, 636 (1969).
34. Id. at 628.
35. For a good discussion of the Court's application of this test, see Mr.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969).
36. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
"I think that this branch of the 'compelling interest' doctrine is sound when
applied to racial classifications for historically the Equal Protection Clause
was largely a product of the desire to eradicate legal distinctions founded
upon race."
1969]
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in many race cases.37 It is hard to see how any racial classifica-
tion could be valid under any test. If the "rational basis" test is
used, in light of the main purpose of the fourteenth amendment,
the racial classification is held unreasonable and irrational.M
Likewise, it is hard to see how a racial classification could be nec-
essary for a "compelling state interest."3 9 Besides voting rights
and race cases, the "compelling state interest" test has been
applied in cases involving the freedom of association," freedom
of interstate movement,41 and it may now apply to any case in-
volving a constitutional right.4
The Court's application of the "compelling state interest"
test to determine whether or not there has been a denial of
equal protection draws into question the constitutionality of many
other laws on the right to vote. Since Cipriano was limited to its
particular facts,48 it did not declare invalid all elections in which
only property owners can vote. However, even if the state may
in some circumstances limit the franchise to those primarily
interested in the subject matter of the election, it does not seem
that an election on the sole question of whether or not to raise
property taxes in order to collect funds for some government
function 44 could constitutionally be limited to just property
owners. In Kramer, New York argued that its "compelling state
interest" was limitation of the franchise to those primarily inter-
ested or directly affected by school decisions, 45 but the Court
found in fact that those excluded were no less interested or
affected than those included.40 And, in Cipriano, the Court found
that since everyone uses utility services, persons who do not own
property are just as interested in the revenue bonds as property
owners. Using the same analysis, everyone who is otherwise
37. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
38. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 403 (1964).
39. See the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Stewart in Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198
(1964).
40. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
41. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
42. Id.: "[A]ppellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, Is
unconstitutional."
43. The Court admitted "[A] state might, in some circumstances, consti-
tutionally limit the franchise to qualified voters who are also specially inter-
ested In the election." Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969).
44. See, e.g., LA. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 14; IA. R.S. 39:702, 781 (1950).
45. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 631 (1969).
46. Id. at 632.
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qualified should be able to vote in property tax elections regard-
less of whether he owns property or ,not. Most people who do
not own property, lease property; and since higher property taxes
will more than likely be passed on the lessee as higher rent, the
lessees have as much interest in property taxes as property
owners. People who neither own nor lease property47 have an
interest in these elections since higher property" taxes might
mean higher prices for goods and services.48 Moreover, these
people would have an interest in seeing that property owners,
with a veto on property tax, did not force the government to get
its money from increased burdens on other sources such as income
or sales. Through our form of representative government, there
are many people who have a say in taxes they do not pay.4 9
Other state voting laws which may now be of questionable
validity are voter residence laws, literacy requirements, laws that
disenfranchise felons and aliens, and laws that require more than
a majority vote. They are discussed not because of any relation
to the facts of the noted cases but to re-examine their validity
under the more rigid test.
One state voting qualification which might not withstand
the "compelling state interest" test is state residence require-
ments. This is so even though there are many cases saying that
the state may set reasonable residency requirements.5 0 But with
the welfare resident case, Shapiro v. Thompson,5 1 and the noted
cases as precedent, state residence requirements might be success-
fully challenged in the near future. The state might argue in
response to such suits, that only residents should vote and that
the waiting period provides an objective test of determining who
is a resident. Such an objective test was rejected in Shapiro, but
it was shown that the states' determination of residency was dif-
ferent from the one-year waiting period.52 Since at some point
47. Examples of persons who do not own or lease property include
clergy, servicemen, and old people who live in the homes of their children
or in rest homes.
48. This was one of appellant's arguments in Kramer and the Court
seemed to accept it. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621, 630 (1969).
49. For example, adults who have no Income, such as some college stu-
dents, or pensioners, vote for a congressman who may vote to raise the fed-
eral income tax; persons who do not drive automobiles have as much say,
through their legislature, in the rate of gasoline tax as those who do drive.
50. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 633, 666 (1966);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965).
51. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
52. Id. at 636.
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a waiting period to prove residence for voting would be unrea-
sonable and since there are other ways of determining actual
residency, this interest of the state might not be found compelling
enough to necessitate a denial of suffrage to bona fide residents.58
Another "compelling state interest" that might make resi-
dency requirements necessary is the interest the state has in
seeing that voters understand the issues involved in an election.
A person who has been a resident of a community only a short
period of time may not understand the issues in a local election.
This interest obviously does not make residency requirements
necessary in presidential elections,5 4 and it might not make such
requirements necessary in local elections, since it can be argued
that most voters (even long-time residents) are informed of the
issues only in the last few weeks of a political campaign.
The "compelling state interest" test also makes doubtful the
constitutionality of state literacy requirements, even though such
requirements were upheld as late as 1959.55 In that case, the tra-
ditional test was used. If the question was raised again, the issue
would be whether the state's interest in seeing that intelligent
and understanding use is made of the ballot is so compelling that
it is necessary to exclude illiterates from voting. One could argue
that it is not necessary since illiterates could become informed
of the campaign issues through means of radio and television.
However, the question may never confront the Court again since
Congress has abolished most literacy tests by legislation. 8
The validity of state laws that disenfranchise felons is
another issue raised by the "compelling state interest" test. A
state's interest in such laws is to prevent corruption of the politi-
cal process.57 A Florida law which denied the right to vote to
felons has been upheld by the Court since the noted cases were
53. Intent is the determining factor of bona fide residency. Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 (1965). The question of unequal treatment of bona
fide residents may also be raised in regard to in-state and out-of-state tui-
tion at state universities. It may be unconstitutional for a state university
to charge one bona fide resident more than another bona fide resident
because the former originally came from another state. It should be remem-
bered that the first sentence of the fourteenth amendent says: "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
54. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
55. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
56. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1965); see also
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
57. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967).
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decided.58 Likewise, a state's interest in seeing that the franchise
is exercised for the good of the state and nation would probably
be held compelling enough to necessitate a denial of the right to
vote to noncitizens; aliens might not have the best interest of
the country at heart but might vote to help the best interest of
their native land. It is also submitted that a state's interest in
seeing intelligent use made of the ballot will be found compel-
ling enough to make state age requirements necessary.9
One of the most controversial issues raised by the test in
the noted cases is the constitutionality of the Louisiana require-
ment that in order to pass or raise a tax, two-thirds of the legis-
lature must vote for the tax.'" This requirement is being chal-
lenged in federal district court."' Similar cases are pending in
California and Idaho.62 These cases challenge a requirement
that it takes two-thirds vote of the people in certain types of
elections, but the Louisiana provision requires a two-thirds vote
in the legislature, not the electorate. For this reason, the issue in
the Louisiana case may be held to be a political question which
the Court will not decide.
An argument against the Louisiana two-third tax law is that
it violates equal protection as expressed in the one man, one vote
principle.68 More specifically, it gives those who oppose taxes
twice the influence of those who favor them. All former applica-
tions of the equal protection clause to voting right cases have
involved the denial or dilution of the right to vote of part of the
electorate, not the legislature.
Assuming that equal protection would be held to apply to
the two-thirds legislative vote rule, the state could argue that
there is a compelling state interest in obtaining a broad basis of
58. Beacham v. Braterman, No. 404 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Oct. 20, 1969), aff'g
300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969). But cf. Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414
P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966). In this case it was held that in order for
such a law to be constitutional it would have to exclude from voting only
those guilty of crimes involving "moral corruption and dishonesty, thereby
branding their perpetrator as a threat to the elective process." Id. at 599,
414 P.2d at 414, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
59. Although it could be argued that there is no compelling state Inter-
est which makes it necessary for a state to exclude persons from the age
of 18 to 21 from voting, the state's interest In seeing intelligent exercise of
the franchise makes it necessary to set some age requirement. It is doubt-
ful that the Court will try to set the age at which a person may vote.
60. LA. CONSr. art. X, § 1(a), added by La. Acts 1955, No. 140, adopted
Nov. 6, 1956.
61. Stafford v. McKeithen, Civil No. 69-190 (E.D. La.) (filed Sept. 19, 1969).
62. 4 LAw iN AcTIoN No. 3, at 7 (1969).
63. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964).
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consent before enacting a tax. A counter-argument to this would
be that in seeking such a broad basis of consent the state is dilut-
ing the vote of those who favor a tax because of their political
views. 4 It is submitted that if the equal protection clause is
found to be applicable to the two-thirds tax law, in light of the
noted cases, it is doubtful that the state can prove a compelling
state interest.
Since the application of the equal protection clause to voting
right cases seems now firmly imbedded in our constitutional law,
the states cannot deny the franchise to anyone unless a "compel-
ling state interest" in doing so is demonstrated. For this reason
many state laws on voter qualifications are of doubtful constitu-
tionality.
R. Bradley Lewis
EXPROPRIATION-LEssEE'S AwARD
Plaintiff, the State of Louisiana through its Department of
Highways, initiated this suit to perfect the expropriation of a
certain tract of land, which was encumbered by a lease with sixty
months left in its unexpired term. The trial court awarded sepa-
rate compensation to the lessee in addition to the value of the
property in perfect ownership awarded to the lessor-landowner.1
Plaintiff appealed on the basis that the lessee's award should be
paid out of, and not in addition to, the amount found by the court
to be the true value of the tract in perfect ownership. Reversing,
the supreme court held that where the value of the taken tract in
perfect ownership is determined by using the actual value of the
lease and the cost of reproduction of the premises less an amount
for depreciation thereof, and these two determinations are sub-
stantially the same, the lessee is to be paid out of and not in ad-
dition to this amount. State, Dep't of Highways v. Holmes, 253
La. 1099, 221 So.2d 811 (1969).
As a practical matter, the process of expropriation 2 was
relatively unknown in the United States in the earliest stages of
64. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562-63 (1964).
1. State, Dep't of Highways v. Holmes, 209 So.2d 780 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1968).
2. As used in this Note, the term "expropriation" means a taking of
private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation
therefor.
[Vol. 30
